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Wednesday, July 04, 2012
Running clinic from residence not a commercial activity: Delhi High Court
From http://www.aalatimes.com/2012/07/03/running-clinic-from-residence-not-a-commercial-activity-delhi-high-court/
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Running clinic from residence not a commercial activity: Delhi High Court
Tuesday, July 3, 2012
New Delhi: Running a clinic from one’s residence can’t be labelled a commercial activity, the Delhi High Court has said.
Quashing a criminal case lodged against Dr D V Chug, who was booked by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) in 2004 for running a clinic from his house at Rajouri Garden, Justice Suresh Kait on Monday said he wasn’t liable to be prosecuted for running the clinic.
“The professional establishment of a doctor cannot come within the definition of commercial activity. Commerce is that activity where a capital is put into work and risk run of profit or loss… The word ‘profession’ used to be confined to the three learned professions: the Church, Medicine and Law. There is a fundamental distinction between the professional activities and commercial activities,” Justice Kait said.
According to the MCD, running of a doctor’s clinic from the residential premises is currently permissible and is not an offence. However, at the time of filing the complaint against Dr Chug, it was not permissible.
-oOo-
Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 1 of 14
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C.No.1474/2007 & Crl.M.A.5115-16/2007
% Judgment reserved on :13
th
March, 2012
Judgment delivered on:02
nd
July,2012
DR. D.V.CHUG ..... Petitioner
Through : Mr. Rajat Aneja &
Mr.Vaibhav Jairaj, Advocates
versus
STATE & ANR ..... Respondents
Through : Mr. Kapil Dutta &
Mr. Ajay Verma, Advocates for
respondent MCD
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
SURESH KAIT, J.
Crl. M.A. No. 5116/2007(exemption)
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
Application stands disposed of.
CRL.M.C.No.1474/2007 & Crl.M.A.5115/2007
1. The instant petition is being filed while challenging the
complaint filed by the MCD under Section 347/461 of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred as ''the said
Act'') against the petitioner.
2. Mr. Rajat Aneja, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that
allegations in the complaint against the petitioner are as under:-Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 2 of 14
That according to the Prosecution Report of
Sh.Hasruddin Khan, Jr. Engineer (Bldg), West
Zone, dated 09.09.2004, the accused Dr. D.V.
Chug, Owner/Occupier of the property No. H.14,
Rajouri Garden, New Delhi, was found committing
the following offence on 09.09.2004 at 11:00AM
under Section 347 of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter called the Act),
which is punishable under Section 461 of the DMC
Act.
That Dr. D.V.Chug, Owner/Occupier of the
Property No.H.14, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi,
has changed the use of the property from
residential to commercial by running clinic of Dr.
D. V. Chug, without written permission of the
Commissioner, MCD. The sanctioned/ permissible
use of this property is residential only.
3. Learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the
notice issued by the respondent No.2, which is at page No.23 wherein
it is stated that the petitioner committed the offence under Section 347
DMC Act by changing the use of property from residential to
commercial by running a clinic of doctor; whereas the MCD
sanctioned the permissible use of this property as residential.
4. Undisputedly, the petitioner is a doctor, who was running his
clinic from his own residence. Allegations in the complaint against
him are that he was using his residential premises for the commercial
activity.
5. The issue arise in the instant petition, whether, running of clinic
from the residential premises, would come in commercial activity. Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 3 of 14
6. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner is now 80 years of
age as on date and the said clinic was closed down ten years back.
Therefore, no purpose would be served by allowing the proceedings
against the petitioner.
7. Learned counsel has relied upon Dr.Devendra M. Surti v. The
State of Gujarat : AIR 1969 SC 63 wherein the Apex Court has
observed as under:-
“6. Under s. 2(8) of the Act an 'establishment' is
defined as meaning 'a shop, commercial
establishment, residential hotel, restaurant, eating
house, theatre, or other place of public amusement
or entertainment to which this Act applies'. Section
2(24) again defines a "Residential hotel", s. 2(25)
a "Restaurant or eating house" and s. 2(27)
similarly defines a "Shop". Section 2(29) defines a
"Theatre". It is clear therefore that the legislature
has taken care separately to define each one of the
categories of 'the establishments mentioned in s.
2(8) of the Act. It is, true that s. 2(4) of the Act has
used words of very wide import and grammatically
it may include even a consulting room where a
doctor examines his patients with the help of a
solitary nurse or attendant. But, in our opinion, in
the matter of construing the language of s. 2(4) of
the Act we must adopt the principle of noscitur a
sociis. This rule, means that, when two or more
words which are susceptible of analogous meaning
are coupled to-ether they are understood to be
used in their cognate sense. The words take as it
were their colour from each other, that is, the
more general is restricted to a, sense analogous to,
a less general. "Associated words take their
meaning from one another under the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 4 of 14
the meaning of a doubtful word may be
ascertained by reference to the meaning of words
associated with it; such doctrine is broiderthan the
maximum Ejusdein Generis." (Words and Phrases.
Vol. XIV, p. 207). For instance, in Reed v.
Ingham(1) it was upon the principle of the maxim
nosscitur a sociis, that a steam tug of eighty-seven
tons burden engaged in moving another vessel was
not a craft within the meaning of the statute.
Again, in Scales v. Pickering(-) the question was
what was the meaning of the word "footway" when
used in a private Act which empowered a water
company to break up the, soil and pavement of
roads. highways, footways, commons, streets,
lanes, alleys', passages and public places.
provided they did not enter upon any private lands
without the consent of the owner. It was contend
that this authorised the company to break up the
soil of a private field in which there was a public
footway, but it was held otherwise. "Construing the
word 'footway,' " said Best C. J. "from the
company in which it is found the legislature
appears to have meant those paved footways in
large towns which are too narrow to admit of
horses and carriages." And Park J. added : "The
word 'footway' here noscitur a sociis." In the
present case, certain essential features or
attributes are invariably associated with the words
"business and trade" as understood in the popular
and conventional sense, and it is the colour of
these attributes which is taken by the other words
used in the definition of s. 2(4') of the Act, though.
their normal import may be much wider. We are
therefore of opinion that the professional
establishment of a doctor cannot come within the
definition of s. 2(4) of the Act unless the activity
carried on was also commercial in character. As
to what exactly is meant by "Commerce" it may be
difficult to define but in an early case-McKav v. Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 5 of 14
Rutherfurd(3), Lord Camp-bell gave a useful
definition : "Commerce is that activity where a
capital is laid out on any work and a risk run of
profit or loss; it is a commercial venture". It is true
that the definition of Lord Campbell is the
conventional definition attributed to trade or
commerce but it cannot be taken to be wholly valid
for the purpose of construing industrial legislation
in a modem welfare State. It is clear that the
presence of the profit motive or the investment of
capital tradition associated to the notion of trade
and commerce cannot be given an undue
importance in construing the definition of
'Commercial establishment' under s. 2(4) of the
Act. In our opinion, the correct test of finding
whether a professional activity falls within s. 2(4)
of the Act is whether the activity is systematically
and habitually undertaken for production or
distribution of goods or for rendering material
services to the community or any part of the
community with the help of employees in the
manner of a trade or business in such an
undertaking. It is also necessary in this connection
to construe the word "profession" under s. 2(4) of
the Act. In Commissioner's of Inland Revenue v.
Maxse(1), Scrutton L.J. stated as follows:-
"I am very reluctant finally to propound a
comprehensive definition. A set of facts not present
to the mind of the judicial propounder, and not
raised in the case before him, may immediately
arise to confound his proposition. But it seems to
me as at present advised that a 'profession' in the
present use of language involves the idea of an
Occupation requiring either purely intellectual
skill, or of manual skill controlled, as in painting
and sculpture, or surgery, by the intellectual skill
of the, operator, as distinguished from an
occupation which IS substantially the production Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 6 of 14
or sale or arrangements for the production or sale
of commodities. The line of demarcation may vary
from time to time. The word 'profession' used to be
confined to the three learned professions, the
Church, Medicine and Law. IL has now, I think, a
wider meaning."
The matter was again considered in another case
where the question was whether a company doing
the work of naval architect could be said to be
carrying on a profession in a naval architecture.
The case was William Esplen, Son, and Swainston,
Ld. v. Inland Revenue Commissioner's 1919-2 KB
731 where Rowlatt J. observed as follows:-"......
but :in my opinion the company is not carry in,--
on the profession of naval architects within the
meaning of the section, because for this purpose it
is of the essence of a profession that the profits
should be dependent mainly upon the personal
qualifications of the person by whom it is carried
on, and that can only be an individual."
7. It is therefore clear that a professional
activity must be an -activity carried on by an
individual by his personal skill and intelligence.
There is a fundamental distinction therefore
between a professional activity and an activity of a
commercial character and unless the profession
carried on by the appellant also partakes of the
character of a commercial nature, the appellant
cannot fall within the ambit of S. 2 (4) of the Act.
In The National Union of Commercial Employees
and another v. M. R. Meher, Industrial Tribunal,
Bombay(1) it was held by this Court that the work
of solicitors is not an industry within the meaning
of s. 2(J) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
therefore any dispute raised by the employees of
the solicitors against them cannot be made the
subject of reference to the Industrial Tribunal. In Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 7 of 14
dealing with this question, Gajendragadkar, J.,
speaking for the Court, observed as follows at
page 163 of ,the Report:-
"When in the Hospital case ((1960) 2 S.C.R. 866)
this Court referred to the Organisation of the
undertaking involving the co-operation of capital
and labour or the employer and his employees, it
obviously meant the co-operation essential and
necessary for the purpose of rendering material
service or for the purpose of production. It would
be realised that the concept of -industry postulates
partnership between capital and labour or between
the employer and his employees. It is under this
partnership that the employer contributes his
capital and the employees their labour and the
joint contribution of capital and labour leads
directly to the production which the industry has in
view. In other words, the co-operation between
capital and labour or between -the employer and
his employees which is treated as a working test in
determining whether any activity amounts to an
industry, is the co- operation which is directly
involved in the production of goods or in the
rendering of service. It cannot be suggested that
every form or aspect of human activity in which
capital and labour cooperate or employer and
employees assist each other is an industry. The
distinguishing feature of an industry is that for the
production of goods or for the rendering of
service, cooperation between capital and labour or
between the employer and his employees must be
direct and must be essential."
Again, at page 166 of the Report Gajendragadkar,
J. proceeds to state
" Does a solicitor's firm satisfy that test ?
Sacrificially considered, the solicitor's firm is no
doubt organised as an industrial concern would be
organised. There are different categories of Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 8 of 14
servants employed by a firm, each category being
assigned separate duties and functions. But it must
be remembered that the service rendered by a
solicitor functioning either individually or working
together with partners is service which is
essentially individual; it depends upon the
professional equipment, knowledge and efficiency
of the solicitor concerned. Subsidiary work which
is purely of an incidental type and which is
intended to assist the solicitor in doing his job has
no direct relation to the professional service
ultimately rendered by the solicitor. For his own
convenience, a solicitor may employ a clerk
because a clerk would type his opinion; for his
convenience, a solicitor may employ menial
servant to keep his chamber clean and in order;
and it is likely that the number of clerks may be
large if the concern is prosperous and so would be
the number of menial servants. but the work done
either by the typist or the stenographer or by the
menial servant or other employees in a solicitor's
firm is not directly concerned with the service
which the solicitor renders to his client and
cannot, therefore, be said to satisfy the test of
cooperation between the employer and the
employees which is relevant to the -purpose. There
can be no doubt that for carrying on the work of a
solicitor efficiently, accounts have to be kept and
correspondence carried on and this work would
need the employment of clerks and accountants.
But has the work of the clerk who types
correspondence or that of the accountant who
keeps account,; any direct or essential nexus or
connection with the advice which it is the duty of
the solicitor to give to his client? The answer to
this question must, in our opinion, be in the
negative. There is, no doubt, a kind of cooperation
between the solicitor and his employees, but that
cooperation has, no direct or immediate relation to Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 9 of 14
the professional service which the solicitor renders
to his client.
........ Looking at this question in a broad and
general way, it is not easy to conceive that a
liberal Profession like that of an attorney could
have been intended by the Legislature to fall within
the definition of 'industry' under s. 2 (J). The very
concept of the liberal professions has its own
special and distinctive features which do not
readily permit the inclusion of the liberal
professions into the four corners of industrial law.
The essential basis of an industrial dispute is that
it is a dispute arising between capital and labour
in enterprises where capital and labour combine to
produce commodities or to render service. This
essential basis would be absent in the case of
liberal professions. A person following a liberal
profession does not carry on his profession in any
intelligible sense with the active cooperation of his
employees and the principal, if not the sole, capital
which he brings into his profession is his special
or peculiar intellectual and educational
equipment. That is why on broad and general
considerations which cannot be ignored, a liberal
profession like that of an attorney must, we think,
be deemed to be outside the definition of 'Industry'
under section2(1)."
Applying a similar line of reasoning we are of
opinion that the dispensary of the appellant would
fall within the definition of S. 2(4) of the Act if the
activity of the appellant is organised in the manner
in which a trade or business is generally organised
or arranged and if the activity is systematically or
habitually undertaken for rendering material
services to the community at large or a part of
such community with the help of the employees and
if such an activity generally involves co-operation Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 10 of 14
of the employer and the employees. To put it
differently, the manner in which the activity in
question is organised or arranged, the condition of
the co-operation between the employer and the
employees being necessary for its success and its
object being to render material service to the
community can be regarded as some of the
features which render the carrying on of a
professional activity to fall within the ambit of S.
2(4) of the Act. Tested in the light of these
principles, we hold that the case of the appellant
does not fall within the purview of the Act and the
conviction of the appellant of the offence under S.
52(e) of the Act read with S. 62 of the Act and r.
23(1) of the Rules is illegal."
8. He also relied upon a decision rendered by Coordinate Bench of
this Court in Crl.M.C.Nos.1459-64/2006 titled Parivar Seva Sansthan
& Ors v. The State wherein vide order dated 20.10.2009 it has been
observed as under:-
“9. Coming to the second submission of the
counsel for the petitioner that with the
enforcement of the Notification dated 7.5.1999, the
petitioner society could run the activity of nursing
home in the residential premises and therefore,
there was no violation of Section 14 of the DDA
Act which could be complained of by the
respondent. For better appreciation of this
contention, Section 14 and Section 29 of the DDA
Act are reproduced as under:-
“14. User of land and buildings in contravention
of plans:-After the coming into operation of any of
the plans in a zone no person shall use or permit to
be used and land or building in that zone
otherwise than in conformity with such plan.Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 11 of 14
Provided that it shall be lawful to continue to use
upon such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed by regulations made in this behalf any
land or building for the purpose and to the extent
for and to which it is being used upon the date on
which such plan comes into force.
„29.Penalties (1) Any person who whether any his
own instance or at the instance of any other person
or anybody (including a department of
Government) undertakes or carries out
development of any land in contravention of the
master plan or zonal development plan or without
the permission, approval or sanction referred to in
section 12 or in contravention of any condition
subject to which such permission, approval or
sanction has been granted, shall be punishable- (a)
with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to
three years, if such development relates to
utilizing, selling or otherwise dealing with any
land with a view to the setting up of a colony
without a lay out plan; and
(b) with simple imprisonment which may extend to
six months, or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees, or with both, in any case, other
than those referred to in clause (a).
(2) Any person who uses any land or building in
contravention of the provisions of section 14 or in
contravention of any terms and conditions
prescribed by regulations under the proviso to that
section shall be punishable with fine which may
extend to five thousand rupees and in the case of a
continuing offence, with further fine which may
extend to two hundred and fifty rupees for very
day during which such offence continues after
conviction for the first commission of the offence.Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 12 of 14
(3) Any person who obstructs the entry of a person
authorized under section 28 to enter into or upon
any land or building or molests such person after
such entry shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to six months, or with
fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or
with both.”
11. With the said notification in place the
respondent DDA could not have filed a complaint
complaining non-conforming use of residential
premises being put to use for running a nursing
home/ guest house and banks unless running of
such activity was not found to be in conformity
with the other conditions concerning the width of
the road and the size of the plot etc. A bare perusal
of the entire complaint would show that nowhere
in the complaint, the respondent DDA has
specifically disclosed as to what was the size of
the plot in which the nursing home was being run
by the accused society and what was the width of
the road facing the plot wherefrom the nursing
home was being run and in the absence of the
same the complaint filed by the respondent DDA
lacked the basic facts and material which could
have disclosed commission of an offence on the
part of the petitioners contravening Section 14 of
the DDA Act read with said Notification.
It is not in dispute that inspection of the
premises of the society was carried out by the field
staff of the DDA after the enforcement of the said
notification and therefore, the field staff in their
inspection report ought to have disclosed the
width of the road and the exact size of the plot
wherefrom the accused society was running the
nursing home and since no such particulars have
been disclosed in the inspection report or in the
complaint, therefore, the complainant
respondent prima facie failed to disclose any Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 13 of 14
violation on the part of the petitioners under
Section 14 of the DDA Act.”
9. On the other hand, ld. counsel for MCD has fairly conceded that
as on today running of a doctor’s clinic from the residential premises is
permissible and is not an offence. However, at the time of filing the
complaint against the petitioner, it was not permissible.
10. He further submitted, be that as it may, the petitioner has closed
down its clinic, that satisfy the complaint.
11. On considering the submissions of ld. counsel appearing for the
parties, I am of the considered view that the professional establishment
of a doctor cannot come within the definition of commercial activity.
Commerce is that activity where a capital is put into; work and risk run
of profit or loss. If the activities are undertaken for production or
distribution of goods or for rendering material services, then it comes
under the definition of commerce. The word ‘profession’ used to be
confined to the three learned professions; the Church, Medicine and
Law. There is a fundamental distinction between the professional
activities and commercial activities.
12. Moreso, in the case Parivar Sewa Sansthan (supra) has held
that running of ‘Nursing Home’ in residential premises does not come
under the commercial activity.
13. More so, the petitioner has already suffered about 8 years as he
has been facing trial since then. Crl.M.C.No.1474/2007 Page 14 of 14
14. Therefore, in view of the reasons recorded above, instant petition
is allowed.
15. Consequently, the proceedings pending against the petitioner
before learned Trial Court are hereby set aside.
16. Bail bonds are cancelled. Surety stands discharged.
17. Crl.M.A.No.5115/2007 does not require further adjudication and
stand disposed of accordingly.
18. Dasti.
SURESH KAIT, J
JULY 02, 2012
Mk
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